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Abstract: This study reexamines the accounting profession's 
response to opportunities and incentives given it during 
three unique periods in its history to foster reliable 
accounting, reporting and auditing practices. By profession, 
we mean the auditors of publicly held companies as 
represented by the American Institute of Accountants and 
its predecessor, the American Association of Public 
Accountants (AAPA). We use two models of 
professionalism, the Functionalist and the Conflict models, 
to interpret the profession's response to these events. We 
find that both self interest and the public interest may have 
motivated many of the actions taken. These motivations are 
not, however, mutually exclusive and both may be used to 
interpret the same behavior. 
INTRODUCTION 
The accounting profession in the United States developed into its 
modern form by 1940. The American Institute of Accountants (AIA) 
was the national organization of accountants. A code of ethics was in 
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place and the AIA had disciplinary authority over its members based on 
that code. The AIA's Committee on Accounting Procedure, forerunner 
to the Accounting Principles Board and later the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, was responsible for setting accounting standards, 
albeit not mandatory at the time. A workable, sometimes uneasy, 
relationship existed between the profession and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. The state societies had licensing control over 
new CPAs, setting educational and experiential requirements, although 
most used the national examination written by the AIA [Miranti, 1990]. 
Annual audits of publicly traded companies were legally mandatory. 
At the beginning of the century, little of this was in place. There was 
no national organization of accountants of any size or influence [Previts 
and Merino, 1979]. The first state licensing legislation was passed in 
New York in 1896. Other states followed but licensing requirements 
varied, ranging from substantial experience, educational and examination 
requirements to virtually none. The minimal amount of regulation over 
accounting and auditing practice may be explained by the relative 
simplicity of accounting and a fairly small securities market. 
An explosion of mergers and consolidations at the beginning of the 
twentieth century accelerated the growth of accountancy. Knowledgeable 
and competent accountants were needed to handle these complex 
accounting transactions and the status of the fledgling discipline began 
to rise [Littleton and Zimmerman, 1962; and Previts and Merino, 1979]. 
Growing companies and expanding manufacturing industries also needed 
accountants to set up financial and cost accounting systems. With the 
later passage of tax legislation, accountants carved out a permanent 
place for their skills in the tax area. 
Until the passage of the Securities Acts, public corporations faced 
little independent oversight. Audits were largely voluntary despite 
spreading public ownership of stock although companies increasingly 
engaged auditors to attest to their annual financial reports [Merino et al, 
1994]. A large portion of audit work prior to 1920 was the balance sheet 
audit attesting to a company's collateral and liquidity to satisfy bankers 
who supplied most corporate financing [Chatfield, 1974]. Companies 
sometimes requested auditing services for their own information 
[Miranti, 1990]. The auditor's role was therefore strikingly different 
from that of today. Francis Pixby, at the 1904 World Congress of 
Accountants, said that the auditor's duty was to the company not to 
stockholders [Previts and Merino, 1979, p. 180]. In 1933, the accounting 
firm Seidman and Seidman wrote that neither audits nor financial reports 
were for the benefit of stockholders [Letter, 4/6/33]. Many prominent 
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people, including accounting practitioners and academics, criticized 
audited financial statements as unreliable for investment decisions 
[Smith, 1912; Kohler, 1926 & 1932; Berle, 1926; Hatfield, 1927; 
Ripley, 1927; Couchman, 1928; Robbins, 1929; Farr, 1933; Pecora, 
1939]. Management could choose from a variety of alternative practices 
and valuation methods without disclosure and could count on the support 
of their auditors. Changes of method were not reported. Despite 
criticism, the business sector was not interested in promoting a stringent 
monitoring system over their activities and were indignant at the 
suggestion. "Every businessman used his own accounting principles and 
fought like hell to sustain them" [Previts and Merino, 1979, p. 219]. 
The voluntary nature of the audit, the absence of authoritative 
accounting rules, and the weakness of auditors worked against the 
presentation of financial statements in accordance with accounting 
conventions considered to be sound according to textbooks and other 
guides of the time [Montgomery, 1926]. 
So long as the discontinuance of audits or change of auditors 
passes without comment from stockholders or creditors, the 
auditors are hampered in their efforts to make accounts as 
accurate and their certificates as complete and informative as 
possible. If auditors take too rigid a stand the directors will 
simply publish unaudited accounts or perhaps seek some more 
amenable auditors [May, 1915, p. 251] 
Twenty years later, Littleton [1935, p. 285-6] believed little had 
changed: "(Q)ualified to serve these men may be, but free to serve with 
a real independence they are not... When their powers of persuasion are 
exhausted, auditors have but little choice except acquiescing or 
resigning." 
PURPOSE 
This study examines the accounting profession's response to 
opportunities and incentives given it during three unique periods in its 
history to foster reliable accounting, reporting and auditing practices. By 
profession, we mean the auditors of publicly held companies as 
represented by the AIA and its predecessor, the American Association of 
Public Accountants (AAPA). We use original correspondence between 
the AIA, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and other published 
materials as evidence. 
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The profession's responses to these opportunities for change may 
have been motivated by self interest rather than by protection of the 
public interest as suggested by the rhetoric of the time and by some 
modern historians. Wootton and Wolk [1992], for example, offer a 
nonproblematic account of the development of the accounting profession 
that obscures the profession's battles to preserve its independence and 
extend its power. 
EVENTS TO BE DISCUSSED 
Three extended events in the profession's history provide the focus 
for this discussion. The first event is the reaction of the profession to the 
demands and regulatory threats posed by bankers, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) from around 
1912 to 1917. The second is the collaboration between the NYSE and 
the AIA as they worked to improve reporting practice in the face of 
impending regulation in the early 1930s. The third is the response of the 
profession to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from 
1934-1939. All three events threatened accountancy's professional 
identity. Two models of professionalism are used to interpret the 
profession's actions. 
APPROACH USED TO ANALYZE THE EVENTS 
The functionalist and the conflict models of professionalism 
[Kultgen, 1988] help interpret the actions of accounting's emerging 
leadership within the AIA. Sociologists have used both models to study 
professions [e.g. Durkheim, 1957; Collins, 1979] and Hooks (1992) 
applied similar models in her analysis of events occurring more recently 
in accounting history. 
The functionalist model explains and predicts the behavior or 
characteristics of either an individual or a group but it is group activities 
that are of particular interest in this research. The primary assumption 
of this model is that the profession is devoted to the public interest, to 
human welfare. The service offered is important and complex requiring 
extensive education, training, experience and a commitment to lifetime 
learning. However, mastery of technical skills is not enough. The 
professional must develop and exercise judgement because client needs 
are highly individual and not amenable to textbook solutions. The 
complexity of these efforts means that only a professional can assess the 
quality of the work performed by another (Kultgen, 1988, p. 79, 81, 91, 
95). 
4
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Professional groups form to ensure quality. They determine what 
technical skills are needed, set standards for admission to the profession, 
provide opportunities for continual education and monitor the work of 
members through peer review and investigations of complaints. They 
write codes of conduct that describe the behaviors professionals should 
exhibit in their work and toward clients and other professionals. The 
desire to preserve quality leads the group to lobby for licensure to 
prevent the unqualified from practicing and harming the public (Kultgen, 
1988, p. 74, 85). 
Society gives the profession a license and a monopoly over practice 
because it values the service and believes that this will help the 
profession ensure high quality performance. Sustaining high quality is 
the duty of a profession that wishes to maintain its license, but it is also 
its desire so it willingly engages in self-monitoring activities. The 
benefits of monopoly are status and high fees but these are secondary to 
the rewards derived from a love of work and a desire to help others. The 
professional is judged therefore, not by the fees commanded but by the 
quality of the service provided (Kultgen, 1988, p. 84, 85, 95). 
The conflict model, which focuses on group behavior, assumes that 
self interest is the dominant motivation of a profession whose purpose it 
is to monopolize control over practice to secure status, power and 
economic gain. It predicts that practitioners will organize and, as a 
group, position themselves as a profession to secure the benefits of 
monopoly. 
Organizing, unrelenting promotion of the value and need of their 
services, writing a code of conduct and setting standards for admission 
are actions taken to convince those in power that a profession deserving 
a license is in place and, once acquired, that it deserves to keep it. Codes 
of conduct may be unenforceable and disciplinary mechanisms weak, but 
the group can point to them as evidence of their concern with the public 
welfare. Prohibitions of contingency fees, competitive bidding and 
advertising serve to create a professional appearance but also protect the 
elite professionals from losing market share to newcomers, even those 
admitted to the professional group. Limiting access to the profession 
through examination and other requirements is not motivated by public 
welfare but by securing economic gain [Kultgen, 1988, p. 122, 123, 
130]. 
Relationships with third parties are important. "The status of the 
individual professional and the entire profession is tied to the status of 
those served" [Kultgen, 1988, p. 128]. The social standing acquired from 
proximity to corporate management or other influential groups, as well 5
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as the fees generated, limit the willingness of the profession to jeopardize 
those relationships by imposing too restrictive standards of practice upon 
them. 
In conclusion, the key to both models is motivation. It is possible for 
an action to be in the public interest while at the same time be an element 
in the profession's negotiation for market power. Since motivation is 
unobservable, and the models predict behaviors that are not mutually 
exclusive, they may be used as alternative explanations for the same 
events. 
THE EVENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THEM 
Event 1: Bankers and Federal Agencies Demand Change 
Bankers in the second decade of this century asked for improvements 
in auditing and accounting. They accused small businesses in particular 
of issuing misleading and unreliable financial statements out of either 
ignorance or deceit without resistance from their auditors [Smith, 1912; 
AIA Special Committee Reports, 1912-1914]. Bankers wanted certain 
auditing procedures to be consistently and universally applied [AAPA, 
Yearbook-1913:159ff] and offered to support the AAPA in its attempts 
to standardize practice. Colley [1914] and Peple [1916], representatives 
of the banking community, strongly supported the audit of financial 
statements and expected auditors to examine carefully accounts 
receivable and inventories not only for their numerical accuracy but for 
their value. 
Edward Hurley, chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
supported these views. Hurley called for auditing instructions: "Which 
would serve as a guide to accountants, bankers, credit men and the 
business public...that...would at least show clearly the level below which 
the accountant could not go and certify the alleged verity of the 
accounts" [Editorial, 1929, p. 357]. He [1916] also recommended to the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) that a federal audit 
bureau check the credentials and reliability of audit practitioners who 
wished to practice before the FRB and name those approved, zone 
experts. 
Hurley also favored uniform accounting, believing that it would 
make financial statements easier to understand and comparable within an 
industry. Uniform accounting meant an industry-wide chart of accounts, 
a standard definition of what was to enter into those accounts and 
uniform cost accounting standards. Many anticipated that cost 
6
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 24 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/4
Sriram: A Reexamination of the Development of the Accounting 71 
Profession—Critical Events from 1912-1940 
accounting standards would end cutthroat competition believing that 
businesses recklessly and ruinously cut prices because they did not know 
their costs [Jordan and Harris, 1921; Dohr et al., 1935]. 
Cost accounting standards did not disturb financial accountants but 
Hurley went further, he wanted to set rules for asset and liability 
valuations. This appalled accountants who believed that such standards 
would grossly misrepresent companies operating in different economic 
environments. They worried that standardization would degrade the 
profession to mere bookkeeping [Previts and Merino, 1979]. 
The 1915 -1917 Minutes of the AAPA and the AIA show that the 
leadership resolved to deflect this potential regulation. To do so, they had 
to demonstrate control over the level of competence of their own 
practitioners. The AIA was formed (and the AAPA dissolved) in 1916 
as a national organization of accountants. Practitioners could gain 
admission and certification by passing a qualifying examination and 
acquiring experience. The Institute elected a board of examiners, 
published "Rules of Professional Conduct," and established a committee 
on professional ethics to exercise disciplinary powers over the 
membership.1 
To meet the challenges to audit practice, the AIA gave the Federal 
Reserve Board a document called Uniform Accounting which the Board 
later published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin of 1917.2 While its title 
and preface suggested that it standardized accounting methods, it did 
not.3 The FRB reissued the document in 1918 under the title Approved 
Methods for Preparation of Balance-Sheet Statements deleting all 
references to uniform accounting. As a result of these actions, Hurley 
dropped the idea of federal registration of accountants [Carey, 1969]. 
1It is probably an exaggeration to assume that the FTC and FRB dropped 
these proposals solely because of the efforts of the profession. The Wilson 
presidential campaign and the entry of the U.S. into World War I necessarily 
deflected the interests of the administration. 
2It was an adaptation of a Price Waterhouse internal control memorandum 
that dealt with auditing procedures for small and medium-sized firms 
[DeMond, 1951]. 
3Both Chatov [1975] and Carey [1969] believe that the AIA took 
advantage of Hurley's confusion over the difference between uniform 
accounting and uniform auditing. 7
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Wootton and Wolk [1992, p. 6] claim that this document "hastened 
the establishment of minimum auditing standards by many accounting 
firms." In fact, Approved Methods reduced them [Merino et al. 1994]. 
It gave management an authoritative source with which to avoid 
procedures that many thought were vital [Carey, 1969; Chatov, 1975; 
Previts and Merino, 1979]. The auditor was to rely upon client assertions 
for most asset-related information including inventories - despite bankers' 
requests [Smith, 1912; Colley, 1914; Peple, 1916]. Approved Methods 
[10] told auditors to confirm accounts receivable "if time permits and 
clients do not object." Internal control evaluations were made optional 
and large companies were largely exempt because good controls were 
presumed to exist. Deference to management was made official. 
Approved Methods recommended a short, standard audit certificate 
despite banking community complaints that the short form audit report 
conveyed little or no information about scope limitations or other 
deficiencies of the audit process.4 The AIA maintained that a short form 
report was less confusing than the longer, unstandardized report that 
smaller audit firms preferred which often contained the audit procedures 
followed and actions taken. The AIA claimed that the excessive verbiage 
in these reports had at times concealed the absence of major auditing 
procedures. 
Functionalist Theory Interpretation of Event 1 
Until this time, accountancy only loosely met the definition of a 
profession. Under criticism by creditors and facing possible regulation 
by Federal agencies, AIA welcomed these incentives to professionalize 
practice as predicted by the functionalist model. It was unthinkable that 
a government agency, ignorant of accounting, might determine who was 
qualified. It should be noted that these were only first steps. The AIA 
was weak. Although the leadership of the AIA was composed of partners 
from the largest accounting firms, it did not represent the majority of 
practicing accountants and, in fact, many resented the organization for 
its elitism [Previts and Merino, 1979; Miranti, 1990]. 
The recommended report read as follows: "I have audited the accounts 
of Blank and Co. for the period from to and I certify that the above 
balance sheet and statement of profit and loss have been made in accordance 
with the plan suggested and advised by the Federal Reserve Board and in my 
opinion set forth the financial condition of the firm at and the results of 
its operations for the period" [Uniform Accounting, 24]. 8
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Accounting knowledge had arrived at a level of complexity that 
called for education and experience. In view of the complaints of 
incompetency and collusion voiced by the banking community, and the 
wide variations in certification requirements of the state bodies, the 
AIA's board of examiners recommended that candidates for certification 
complete a 'preliminary education' (a controversial requirement left 
undefined), five years of experience (with exceptions) and an 
examination. Certification would give the public assurance that these 
practitioners possessed a level of competency upon which they could 
rely, an assurance unavailable in some states where certification 
standards were low. These controls may be construed as the first 
attempts of the profession on a national basis to contract with the state 
(represented by the FTC and FRB). In the long term, only licensure 
would ensure that the profession could control the quality of the services 
offered. 
The AIA did not attempt to set accounting standards or to limit 
management choices. The leadership placed a high premium on expert 
judgement and expected the professional to oppose management only 
rarely, using powers of persuasion. Since audits were voluntary, there 
were few other options. There was no process in place where 
practitioners might debate accounting practices and find consensus. 
Given the AIA's lack of influence over a wide range of practitioners, 
limitations on management choice would have to wait until power was 
consolidated. Until then, the AIA could only begin to control the 
qualifications of its own members, build their reputations and increase 
the confidence of the public. As for auditing practice, the AIA again 
relied heavily on professionalism. Approved Methods offered guidelines 
but retained professional judgement as the preserve of the auditor who 
alone could act in the interest of outside users. 
Conflict Theory Interpretation of Event I 
Many of the actions taken by the AIA may have been motivated by 
self interest, as attempts to gain market control and limit audit practice. 
The examination was controlled by an elite group and could restrict the 
number of those admitted and the type of person admitted. Indeed, there 
were many complaints [Previts and Merino, 1979; Miranti, 1990]. A 
national organization could dislodge competitors and avoid competition. 
By successfully negotiating with federal agencies, the profession not only 
avoided regulation but gained status. Though not a true license, the 
perception of AIA members as purveyors of higher quality service, 
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would disadvantage those practicing outside of the purview of the 
national organization. 
The code of ethics prohibited advertising and competitive bidding. 
While leading practitioners advanced compelling arguments in support 
of the bans [Editorial, 1914 & 1915], smaller firms viewed them as 
deliberate constraints on the expansion of their practices [Letter to the 
Editor, 1914; Shorrock, 1914]. The code, while a symbol of professional 
practice, functioned to preserve the market power of the elite firm. 
Advocacy of a standardized short form report also worked to the 
detriment of the small firm. Those desiring membership in the AIA were 
barred from differentiating their services in a positive way. Byington and 
Sutton [1991] said that buyers rely on brand names as a surrogate for 
quality and recent research shows that a differentiation of quality is 
perceived by buyers of auditing services between the Big 6 and non Big 
6 firms. Indeed, banker J. Cannon wrote " . . . we strongly advocate and 
prefer to buy the paper of those concerns whose accounts are audited by 
established firms of accountants" [Colley, 1914, p. 425]. The AIA 
effectively cut off most of the avenues available to the small firm to 
attract audit clients. 
Claims of specialized knowledge and expertise may mask a self 
interest motivation. The profession cultivated the perception that they 
possessed information difficult to acquire and reliably exercised and 
monitored only by themselves. Educational requirements, examination 
and an esoteric vocabulary perpetuated this notion. The idea that these 
practices might be standardized was understandably anathema. If 
accounting could be standardized then it was a technical discipline which 
could be performed by anyone, threatening the emerging profession. 
With the support of bankers and the federal agencies, the 
accountancy profession might have made progress in setting accounting 
and auditing standards. But the leadership resisted, arguing that uniform 
accounting practices would mislead and that uniform auditing practices 
would reduce audit practice to the lowest common denominator. Only the 
experienced professional could understand the audit requirements of a 
unique accounting system and pass on the appropriateness of the 
accounting choices made [AAPA Yearbook, 1916]. If these functions 
could be exercised by rote, then accountancy was not a profession. 
Deference to corporate management maintained the profession's 
relationship with those with whom there were social and financial 
linkages. Claims that egregious practices would be dealt with in a period 
when there were no authoritative standards can hardly be taken seriously. 
Approved methods provided protection against liability by giving 
10
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auditors a defense against non-performance of tasks and for reliance on 
management. 
Event 2: Collaboration of the ALA and the NYSE from 1931-1933 
Although George O. May, representing the AIA, had established an 
advisory relationship with the NYSE in 1927 (May, 1962), it was not 
until it was clear that the depression was unlikely to abate and that the 
public anger directed towards business was rising [Krooss, 1970] that 
the Exchange awoke to the value of instituting change. Some form of 
federal regulation over corporate reporting practices appeared imminent 
[Kohler, 1934]. Hoxsey [1931, p. 2ff], executive assistant of the 
Committee on Stock List of the NYSE, wrote to the AIA and warned 
that "some form of regulation is inevitable. . . if we act now. . . we may 
retard unwarranted intrusions." 
The extant correspondence reveals that neither organization was 
anxious to take the lead. Hoxsey [1931] asked the AIA's Special 
Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges5 to assume 
responsibility for the suitability of management-selected accounting 
principles and for a definition of full and fair disclosure. The AIA 
responded that "the primary responsibility for selection of principles and 
scope of disclosure must remain that of directors and officers of the 
corporation" [AIA, 1931]. 
With income statement data becoming more and more important to 
stockholders, Hoxsey asked auditors to insist that stockholders be 
advised as to the sources of income, separately disclosing extraordinary 
items, and to discourage management from using reserves to smooth 
income. The AIA Committee replied that auditors lacked the power to 
mandate such disclosures [Letter, 5/19/31]. 
The AIA Committee in turn [Letter, 9/22/32] asked the Exchange to 
educate the public about the limitations of financial statements, 
particularly their historical nature, to require that accounting methods be 
disclosed and be consistently applied and that extraordinary items and 
subsidiary income be segregated from ordinary income. They 
recommended an annual audit and that every company adhere to five 
broad principles of accounting which they believed were generally 
5
 The member of the committee included Archibald Bowman, Arthur 
Carter, Charles Couchman, Samuel Leidesdorf, William Lybrand, and George 
May—all representatives of major accounting firms. 
11
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accepted (see Appendix). The Exchange accepted all of the Committee's 
recommendations but one, disclosure of accounting methods. Whitney, 
the president of the NYSE, wrote to the presidents of all listed companies 
that financial statements issued in connection with listing applications 
made after July 1, 1933 had to be audited. He added that, to serve as 
useful safeguards for investors, "audits should be adequate in scope and 
that the responsibility assumed by the auditor should be defined" [Letter, 
1/31/33]. He asked all companies to secure from their auditors a letter 
addressing most of the points made by the AIA's Committee: 
1) was the audit as extensive as that outlined by the 
publication Verification of Financial Statements (VFS) (the 
1929 revision of Approved Methods), 
2) had all subsidiaries been audited or their relative 
importance to the parent company explained, 
3) had the auditors received all information requested, 
4) were the financial statements fairly presented, 
5) were accounting methods consistently applied and, 
6) did the methods used conform to accepted accounting 
practices? (see Appendix.) 
Nine major accounting firms jointly responded to the announcement. 
Although supportive of the specific points outlined above, they wanted 
to clarify the some of the limits of the audit engagement. They reiterated 
[Letter, 2/24/33] that the guidelines outlined by VFS were not intended 
to uncover fraud and that to do so would require an audit so expensive 
as to outweigh any advantages. To avoid fraud, management was 
responsible for establishing and maintaining an adequate system of 
internal control. They reminded the Exchange that the auditor 
traditionally focused on the balance sheet and would continue to do so, 
guarding against overstatements of income not by extensive testing of 
income accounts but by assuring the correctness of beginning and ending 
balance sheets accounts. They reemphasized the importance of 
consistency rather than uniformity of method. The audit report stated 
that management's representations were reasonable, not all inclusive nor 
necessarily optimal, in the auditor's view. The auditor could not replace 
12
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 24 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/4
Sriram: A Reexamination of the Development of the Accounting 11 
Profession—Critical Events from 1912-1940 
his judgement for that of management and could only qualify the report 
if the choices were very unsound. 
Hoxsey was not satisfied by these circumscriptions of responsibility. 
He insisted that auditors "should satisfy themselves that the system of 
internal check provides adequate safeguards" and "accept the burden of 
seeing that the income received and the expenditures made are properly 
classified in so far as the facts are known to them" [Letter, 10/24/33]. He 
also asked the AIA to develop a clearer and more informative auditor's 
report. 
The AIA found Hoxsey's income statement requests reasonable but 
were careful in their response to the question of internal control [Letter, 
12/21/33]. "It is always a matter of executive judgment to weigh the 
risks against which safeguards are desirable against the cost of providing 
safeguards." Claiming that accountants evaluated internal control as a 
integral part of the audit, they cited VFS. "The scope of the work 
indicated in these instructions includes. . . an examination of the 
accounting system for the purpose of ascertaining the effectiveness of the 
internal check." It is noteworthy that the adverb "incidentally" which 
appears in VFS in place of the three dots is omitted in the letter to the 
Exchange. The use of the word "incidentally" weakened the guidelines. 
It suggested that checking controls was likely to happen during the 
examination, but not that it must happen. 
The liability that might rise out of the wording of the audit report 
worried accounting firms. May sent a draft of a revised report to the 
major firms for comment and received responses from Leidesdorf, from 
Barrow, Wade and Guthrie, Haskins and Sells, and Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell. Leidesdorf [Letter, 11/17/33] wrote that the statement 
"supplied with all the explanations and information which are necessary" 
be replaced by "based on our examination and information furnished to 
us." He warned that the former did not recognize the possibility that 
management might have withheld information leaving all responsibility 
with the auditor. Carter of Haskins and Sells [Letter, 11/24/33] wrote 
that the report should clearly state the relationship between the auditor 
and the client. 
I refer particularly to the theory of relationship which holds the 
client to be the author of the financial statements and regards 
the accountant as the reviewer of such statements.. This position, 
in addition to having possible legal value, is, as we have learned 
. . . , an invaluable one when controversies arise with clients as 
to the disclosures which should be made. 13
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The format of the standard unqualified audit report was finally approved 
at the beginning of 1934 after considerable debate. 
Functionalist Theory Interpretation of Event 2 
Affiliation with the NYSE gave the leadership a rich opportunity to 
serve the public. With the support of the NYSE, they could resolve some 
of the major issues of accounting practice and presentation and begin a 
process of expanding public knowledge. The leaders of the AIA knew 
that some investors misunderstood the nature of the financial statements 
and the audit report, assuming that the current valuations comprised the 
balance sheet and the report testified to an enterprise's future success. 
Understanding their historical nature was an important component in 
becoming an informed investor. However, the profession needed the 
Exchange's help in publicizing this perhaps because of a lack of funds or 
a lack of access to the public. Whether the Exchange actually embarked 
on a program of educating the public is unknown. 
The profession's unwillingness to expand its responsibility for 
accessing internal control and the detection of fraud was not unrealistic, 
reflecting its knowledge that both were controlled by management. To 
ensure either exceeded their ability. It would not be in the public's 
interest to suggest otherwise. The AIA strongly preferred disclosure and 
consistency of accounting method over uniformity for two reasons. They 
believed that firms were unique and that corporate management could 
best determine which methods most clearly reflected performance and 
condition. Disclosure of methods should provide sufficient information 
for the informed user. They also argued that, taken over time, differences 
between accounting methods were unimportant if those methods were 
consistently applied. Although the AIA only convinced the Exchange to 
require a statement of consistency, at least they minimized a common 
method of manipulating financial statements. The Exchange also 
supported the AIA's opinion on significant issues, such as limiting the 
practice of smoothing income by using surplus accounts to bypass the 
income statement (see Appendix). In this way, the profession could 
protect the investing public from significant and common 
misrepresentations. 
Conflict Theory Interpretation of Event 2 
Collaboration with the NYSE benefitted the AIA considerably. First, 
the formal association with the Exchange was prestigious. Second, the 
NYSE's annual audit requirement granted a contract to accountants 
14
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ensuring future income. Although the Exchange did not limit audits to 
AIA members, it is likely that its relationship with the AIA bolstered 
member firm's relative power in the accounting market, at least among 
listed corporations. Third, recognizing VFS as the auditing standard 
distinguished the AIA as the authoring institution. Fourth, despite the 
rising profile of the AIA and auditing services, there was no increase in 
auditor responsibilities beyond those supported by the NYSE and 
therefore, no substantive change in the auditor-client relationship. 
The public collaboration with the NYSE created a perception that 
the profession was working to improve the financial reporting function. 
However, little changed. The accounting principles agreed to were few, 
and although 'few' in and of itself is not negative adjective, many of the 
most controversial issues of the period including the treatment of 
depreciation, bond discount and no par stock remained unsettled and no 
mechanism for resolving these issues was put in place. Audits, though 
required, still left major tasks optional and corporate management 
retained the prerogative of preferability choices without disclosure. The 
profession had raised its profile, potentially increased the market share 
of major member firms, and appeared to be working in the public interest 
while minimizing any expansion of its own responsibility. 
Event 3: The SEC and the AIA 1934-1939 
The years 1934-1939 were critical ones. It was possible that the 
traditional practice of accountancy would not survive and the profession 
had to work to maintain its identity. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission, created in 1934, had absolute authority over accounting 
matters. It could determine who could practice before it. It could set 
accounting standards and could require auditors to take responsibility for 
the choice of accounting methods. 
SEC members, inexperienced but determined to put the Act into 
operation, decided that the best approach was to work with existing 
professional bodies. They solicited the profession's help in designing the 
forms needed to satisfy the Act's regulations, in appointing suitable 
commissioners, and encouraged them to set accounting standards. The 
AIA was slow to act on the latter. Consequently, the SEC frequently and 
publicly criticized the profession for the accounting treatments found in 
submissions [Landis, 1936; Blough, 1937a]. Members [Landis, 1936; 
Blough, 1937c; Mathews, 1937; Healy, 1938] threatened that the SEC 
15
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might have to standardize accounting.6 They displayed irritation at the 
profession's inability to monitor management, its unwillingness to take 
responsibility for accounting presentations, and its repeated issuance of 
uninformative or misleading audit reports. They complained that the 
often-cited generally accepted accounting principles did not exist and 
questioned the qualifications of some appearing before them [Blough, 
1937a, 1937b, 1938; Werntz, 1939]. The SEC began issuing Accounting 
Series Releases (ASR) in 1937, setting accounting rules for registrants. 
The AIA fought these encroachments. It supported corporate 
assertions that disclosure of sales, cost of sales, gross profit, and salaries 
would give too much information to competitors. The AIA's Committee 
on Cooperation with the SEC reproached the SEC for not accepting 
these claims. Chairman Wellington argued that this information "might 
be damaging to the company and therefore of injury to the stockholders" 
[AIA Minutes, 1936, p. 53]. 
Despite its threats of standardization [Landis, 1936; Healy, 1938], 
the agency eventually settled for consistency and disclosure of method 
[Merino and Coe, 1978]. Curiously, the SEC did not mandate that a 
statement of accounting policies appear in the annual reports to 
shareholders. Although such a statement was required in the 10K, the 
latter was not usually mailed to shareholders. Enforcing fair disclosure 
of accounting methods therefore made no sense [Kaplan and Reaugh, 
1939]. 
The SEC's ASRs #1-3 were not new accounting standards but rather 
formalizations of the accounting rules written earlier by the AIA in 
agreement with the NYSE (Coffey, 1976). In 1938, they issued ASR #4. 
This stated that financial statements filed with them would be deemed 
misleading if they lacked substantial authoritative support and left the 
determination of authoritative support to the accounting profession. The 
SEC adopted the role of endorser and enforcer of the AIA rules (Coffee, 
1976, p. 220). 
Regarding audit practice, the AIA issued Examination of Financial 
Statements [1936]. It did not expand audit procedures over internal 
6
"The impact of almost daily tilts with accountants, some of them called 
leaders of their profession, often leaves little doubt that their loyalties to 
management are stronger than their sense of responsibility to the investor. 
Such an experience does not lead readily to acquiescence in the pleas recently 
made by one of the leaders of the accounting profession that the form of 
statement can be less rigidly controlled and left more largely to professional 
responsibility alone" (Landis, 1939). 16
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control, inventories or accounts receivable. Samuel Broad, Chairman of 
the AIA Committee charged with revising VFS, said that VFS had been 
criticized as "too mandatory in its presentation" a defect eliminated in 
this document which emphasized flexibility and judgement [Broad, 1936, 
p. 58-9]. The document reasserted the profession's position that 
disclosure was a management prerogative and that the auditors would 
only rarely issue qualified reports. The audit procedures, the extent of 
disclosures and the accounting principles and practices set out in this 
document were "only those which we believed were pretty generally 
agreed to. . .we did not try to break new ground" [Broad, 1936, p. 59-
60]. 
The AIA remained committed to the short-form standard audit report 
[Letter, 1935; Couchman, 1939]. The AIA Committee on Cooperation 
with the SEC debated the wording extensively [AIA Minutes 1939, p. 
166,170,172]. The Committee wanted a format acceptable to the SEC 
which limited auditor responsibility. The Committee on Auditing 
Procedure made only a few cautiously worded changes to the audit 
report approved in 1939 (Kohler, 1941). The report minimized liability 
more than it provided information to investors. 
Why (did SEC abdicate its power? Some historians insist it did not. 
McCraw [1982] is persuaded that the SEC was entirely successful in 
negotiating substantive change on behalf of stockholders with both the 
accounting profession and the NYSE. Coffee (1976) is slightly less 
sanguine but overall remains confident that the results of the SEC and 
AIA collaboration were successful. Others, more informed about 
accounting, insist all changes were merely symbolic [Merino and 
Neimark, 1987; Chatov, 1975]. 
One reason is that the AIA strengthened itself. Attacked by the 
American Association of University Instructors in Accounting (AAUIA) 
[see Kohler's scathing 1934 editorial] which, with the blessing of SEC 
commissioner Robert Healy [1938], might have preempted the AIA in 
setting accounting standards, the AIA decided to reassert its leadership 
in this area. In 1936 the AIA completed a difficult merger with the rival 
American. Society of Certified Public Accountants (AS CPA), a national 
accounting body of about the same size thereby deflecting a potential 
alliance between that group and the academics of the AAUIA. Now 
larger, representing about a third of accountants nationwide, and with a 
claim to expanded self-monitoring, the new AIA could act from strength. 
They formed the Committee on Accounting Procedure in 1938 to study 
and write accounting standards [Previts and Merino, 1979; Miranti, 
1990]. Thus, the AIA acted in accordance with the agency's wishes. 
17
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Another reason may have been that the political tide was shifting to 
the right. Business found that it was again gaining power. The economy 
appeared to be improving, if slowly, and the Supreme Court had declared 
major New Deal legislation unconstitutional. All of business wanted to 
avoid further government regulation. In this atmosphere, it may have 
been expedient for the SEC to back off. 
The ALA now represented a broader constituency and established a 
standard-setting body. The SEC retained their declamatory speeches 
keeping their real power as a constant threat. They continued to issue 
stop orders if particularly egregious accounting presentations were filed 
but, as of 1938, they left accounting matters to the accountants. 
Functionalist Theory Interpretation of Event 3 
The functionalist model predicts that professionals will actively 
protect the public interest but does not require the existence of a formal 
professional organization. The AIA, up until this point, trusted in the 
professionalism of individual practitioners, attempting only to ensure that 
they had been effectively educated and were experienced. Circumstances 
forced the AIA to move the profession to another level. The SEC could 
legally appropriate control over audit practice and accounting matters, 
a possibility which threatened placing nonexperts in the position of 
judging a complex discipline. To protect the public, it became necessary 
for the AIA to convince the SEC that it was best to keep auditing and 
accounting in the hands of professionals. To do so, it was imperative that 
they be able to influence and monitor practitioners since the status quo 
projected disunity and carried the stigma of competition. Unlike other 
businesses, competition in a profession is viewed negatively, suggesting 
that profits are more important than public interest. The merger with the 
ASCAP doubled the AIA's membership and probably included most of 
those who audited public companies. This gave the AIA the ability to 
monitor those likely to appear before the SEC. 
The profession believed that unique environments call for varied 
accounting methods and that standardization across dissimilar industries 
would be misleading at best. Consequently, the leadership first fought the 
SEC's threats of regulation by arguing convincingly for consistency and 
disclosure of methods, which the SEC soon required, as opposed to 
uniformity. 
The Securities Acts did not give power to the profession, but did 
confer on it responsibility and substantial liability. If the profession were 
to act in the public interest, it needed power. This it received, when the 
SEC delegated that authority in ASR #4. With few exceptions, the 
18
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agency has supported the AIA and the decisions of its successor bodies. 
With this in hand, accountancy's governing bodies could seek consensus 
on matters of general interest and this they tried to do by establishing the 
Committee on Accounting Procedure. Though in hindsight this 
Committee may not have been wholly effective (Previts and Merino, 
1979, 269), its formation and purpose was in the public interest. 
Conflict Theory Interpretation 
The conflict model is also informative. The 1934 Securities Act 
handed accountancy a market.7 The AIA wanted to monopolize it and it 
did so by professionalizing its image. The merger strengthened the AIA's 
negotiating position with the SEC. It now had influence over and 
appeared able to monitor a substantial constituency. Although often 
openly criticized by members of the SEC, the AIA turned some of the 
criticisms to their advantage. They requested, and the SEC agreed 
[Report, 1937], that questionable accounting questions and misleading 
audit certificates be forwarded to them for comment and resolution. This 
gave the AIA additional authority, bringing unsatisfactory reports of 
both member and non-member audit firms under their jurisdiction. 
The formation of the Committee on Accounting Procedure was a 
unifying one. It included AIA members, ex-SEC commissioner Carmen 
Blough, and members of the AAUIA who had frequently criticized the 
AIA. The AIA thus eliminated by incorporation, its challengers to 
accounting setting while creating a body too large to come to consensus 
on controversial issues thus retaining many alternative practices (i.e 
treatment of bond discount and of gains or losses on retirement of bonds) 
and maintaining management freedom. They avoided proactive, positive 
improvements in audit practice. Improvements were to come subsequent 
to the embarrassment of McKesson-Robbins. No significant changes 
appeared in the auditor's certificate. The AIA therefore negotiated a 
successful relationship with the SEC, an agency that posed a definite 
threat and in doing so increased its prestige and consolidated its power 
without altering accounting, the audit function or the relationship of 
auditors with corporate management. 
7It is possible that the audit requirement was added as a result of back 
room lobbying [Miranti 1990]. 
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Postscript: McKesson Robbins Expands Audit Procedures 
Until the McKesson Robbins fraud came to light in 1939, auditing 
guidelines were ambiguous regarding receivables, inventories and 
internal controls. Even sophisticated users were unaware that auditors 
did not physically inspect inventories. Hoxsey, the Secretary of the 
NYSE, was furious to learn that the auditors had used the "testing" 
phrase to limit the scope of audit with respect to receivables and 
inventories [Correspondence, 1939]. 
. . . it simply did not occur to me to doubt that inventories and 
receivables were spot-checked to a sufficient degree to make the 
auditors feel warranted in giving the financial statements 
approval...I did not know that the statement 'but we did not 
make a detailed audit of the transactions' covered such omission 
[Correspondence, 2/22/39]. 
The McKesson Robbins case resulted in increasing auditor 
responsibilities significantly. For the first time, a professional 
pronouncement, "Extension of Audit Procedures" (adopted by the AIA 
council on May 9, 1939) instructed auditors to go beyond the books 
requiring inventory verification, accounts receivable confirmation and an 
assessment of internal control. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Historical evidence can be interpreted in a variety of ways. 
Motivation is not observable and formal statements may not be taken at 
face value. Certainly an interpretation that assumes that all change is 
evolutionary and that evolutionary change is progress towards the good 
must be challenged. So it is with the development of the accounting 
profession. One may interpret the adoption of a code of ethics, the 
establishment of educational standards, the creation of a national 
organization with power of self regulation as actions taken to promote 
the public interest. At the same time, these actions do control the 
profession, limit entry to it and secure high economic rents from so 
doing. 
There is no doubt that accounting and auditing are learned skills that 
require the exercise of judgement. But the profession rarely articulated 
what audit services were meant to accomplish stressing instead what 
could not be done and repeating, rather unsatisfactorily, that audit 
20
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judgements were nothing more than opinions. The AIA was not proactive 
in setting audit standards for critical areas, resisted setting accounting 
standards, declined to clarify the responsibility of the audit firm and 
deferred to the desires of corporate management. Whether these choices 
were made because the profession sincerely believed that the auditor's 
professional judgement must always predominate over standards and 
regulations to ensure reliable reports or whether they were chosen in 
order to sustain the status quo in regards to relationships with corporate 
management is a matter of interpretation. 
Accountancy today is without doubt a profession, carrying with it 
all the characteristics that one might choose to define a profession. It is 
also true that accountancy faces similar criticisms to those it received in 
the past. What is the auditor's responsibility? Has the auditor failed if a 
firm collapses and he or she issued an unqualified report just before the 
collapse? Are the battles to deflect liability attempts to avoid 
responsibility or efforts to restore justice in an unjust system? Should the 
accountant 'blow the whistle' or are quitting or issuing a qualified report 
still the only options available? There is still some doubt about the 
identity of the client. The responses to these questions made by the 
profession, as similar responses were made in the past, will likely be 
claimed by the profession as in the public interest and by critics as in the 
interest of the profession itself. The truth, whatever it may be, is likely 
to lie somewhere in between. 
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APPENDIX 
Statement of Certain Accounting Principles Recommended by 
Committee of American Institute of Accountants on Cooperation With 
Stock Exchanges 
1. Unrealized profit should not be credited to income account of the 
corporation either directly or indirectly, through the medium of charging 
against such unrealized profits amounts which would ordinarily fall to 
be charged against income account. Profit is deemed to be realized when 
a sale in the ordinary course of business is effected, unless the 
circumstances are such that the collection of the sale price is not 
reasonably assured. An exception to the general rule may be made in 
respect of inventories in industries (such as the packing house industry) 
in which owing to the impossibility of determining costs it is a trade 
custom to take inventories at net selling prices which may exceed cost. 
2. Capital surplus, however created, should not be used to relieve the 
income account of the current or future years of charges which would 
otherwise fall to be made there-against. This rule might be subject to the 
exception that where, upon reorganization, a reorganized company would 
be relieved of charges which would require to be made against income 
if the existing corporation were continued, it might be regarded as 
permissible to accomplish the same result without reorganization 
provided the facts were as fully revealed to and the action as formally 
approved by the shareholders as in reorganization. 
3. Earned surplus of a subsidiary company created prior to 
acquisition does not form a part of the consolidated earned surplus of the 
parent company and subsidiaries; nor can any dividend declared out of 
such surplus properly be credited to the income account of the parent 
company. 
4. While it is perhaps in some circumstances permissible to show 
stock of a corporation held in its own treasury as an asset if adequately 
disclosed, the dividends on stock so held should not be treated as a credit 
to the income account of the company. 
5. Notes or accounts receivable due from officers, employees, or 
affiliated companies must be shown separately and not included under 
a general heading such as Notes Receivable or Accounts Receivable. 
22
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